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In April 1987, Amy Carter, Abbie Hoffman, and 13 other protes-
ters were tried in Northampton, Massachusetts, for trespassing and
disorderly conduct during a demonstration against the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA).' The defendants raised the "necessity de-
fense," arguing that their actions were justified as reasonable efforts
to "prevent other crimes that pose the 'clear and immediate threat'
of greater harm." 2 District Court Judge Richard F. Connon in-
structed the jury on the availability of this defense under Massachu-
setts case law, and permitted the jury to hear extensive testimony on
the harms caused by the CIA. The witnesses "described assassina-
tions, murders, campaigns of misinformation and other alleged ac-
tivities by the agency and groups it supports in Central America and
elsewhere."' 3 All the defendants were acquitted.
In contrast, earlier this year 18 activists were found guilty for
demonstrating in the Rotunda of the Capitol, while protesting
United States aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. 4 Judge Luke C.
Moore, of the District of Columbia Superior Court, did not allow
the jury to hear the defendants' arguments and testimony that inter-
national law required that they "take action to stop the United
States' illegal war of aggression against the Nicaraguan people,"
5
and that their demonstration in the Capitol was a legitimate and ef-
fective means of altering national policy. 6
In both cases, peace activists attempted to show that their acts of
civil disobedience were legally justified, under either the doctrine of
necessity or international law. Until recently, such justifications
rarely have succeeded, simply because most judges have been un-
1. Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 8745JC-OOIIA (Northampton Dist. Ct. Apr. 15,
1987). See N. Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
2. N. Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
3. Id. at B9, col. 1.
4. United States v. Arnold, No. M9198-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 1987). See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 1987, at A9, col. 4.
5. N. Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1987, at A9, col. 5 (quoting defense lawyer Nina Kraut).
6. Id. at col. 4 (report of the testimony of defendants' witnesses, former United
States Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and former Defense Department analyst Daniel
Ellsberg, who released the "Pentagon Papers").
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willing to allow the jury to hear the justifications. In most civil diso-
bedience trials, judges have ruled as a matter of law that the
defendants' theory of justification is not applicable, and they have
excluded all supporting evidence and testimony. 7 The result has
been conviction for most civilly disobedient defendants. In con-
trast, when the jury has been permitted to hear and consider the
merits of the defendants' justifications, it has granted acquittals
more often than not.8
The purpose of this Current Topic is to demonstrate that de-
fenses based on the often interrelated claims of necessity and inter-
national law should be permitted in trials of peace activists who have
commmited civil disobedience, whether or not the defenses ulti-
mately persuade a jury. The systematic rejection of the defenses
and exclusion of evidence and witnesses raise serious constitutional
questions pertaining to the defendants' right to a fair jury trial.9
I. The Concept of Civil Disobedience
The proposition that civil disobedience-"the deliberate violation
of law for a vital social purpose"' 0-can be legally justified may
seem at odds with a common view that the civilly disobedient must
7. See Vance, The Necessity Defense in Political Trials: An Appraisal, in Por Amor Al
Pueblo: Not Guilty!: The Trial of the Winooski 44 (B. Bradley, N. Hine, J. Vollmann &
N. Wasserman eds. 1986) [hereinafter Por Amor]; Aldridge & Stark, Nuclear War, Citi-
zen Intervention, and the Necessity Defense, 26 Santa Clara L. Rev. 299 (1986); Note,
Antinuclear Demonstrations and the Necessity Defense: State v. Warshow, 5 Vt. L. Rev.
103 (1980); Comment, Civil Disobedience and the First Amendment, 32 UCLA L. Rev.
904 (1985).
8. Aldridge & Stark, supra note 7, at 300. Aldridge and Stark identify "a small but
growing practice of allowing juries to hear a necessity defense." Id. at 300. Since crimi-
nal cases resulting in acquittal are not reported, the census is speculative.
In my research, I have found the following cases in which the civilly disobedient have
been acquitted: People v. Block (Gait Jud Dist., Sacramento Co. Muni. Ct., Cal. 1979)
(nuclear power); Chicago v. Streeter, No. 85-108644 (Cook Co. Cir. Ct., Ill. 1985)
(apartheid); People v. Jarka, No. 002170 (Lake Co. Cir. Ct., Il1. 1985) (nuclear arms
buildup and Central America); People v. Brown, 78 CM2522 (19th Dist., Lake Co., Ill.
1979) (nuclear power); State v. Mouer, No. 77-246 (Columbia Co. Dist. Ct., Ore. 1977)
(nuclear power); State v. Keller, No. 1372-4-84 CnCr (Chittendon Cir. Dist. Ct., Vt.
1984) (Central America). See also Washington v. Karon, No. J85-1136 (Benton Co. Dist.
Ct., Wa. 1985) (charges dismissed after the judge admitted evidence on necessity and
international law).
Summaries and court documents of many unpublished cases involving civil disobedi-
ence are available from the Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute, Peace Law and Educa-
tion Project, Box 673, Berkeley, CA 94701.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 31-37.
10. H. Zinn, Disobedience and Democracy: Nine Fallacies on Law and Order 39
(1968).
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willingly submit to punishment."' "One who breaks an unjust law,"
wrote Dr. Martin Luther King from his Birmingham jail cell,
must do it ... with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an
individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and
willingly accepts the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience
of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the very
highest respect for law.
12
A "willingness to accept the penalty" if legal justification fails, how-
ever, does not imply that the civilly disobedient must refrain alto-
gether from efforts to legally justify their conduct. Moreover, Dr.
King's reflections concerned the best political strategy for overcom-
ing segregation. Accepting the penalty and staying in jail would
"arouse the conscience of the community." It would "establish such
creative tension that a community that has constantly refused to ne-
gotiate is forced to confront the issue."' 3 For King, as for the civilly
disobedient today, the goal was social change, not penance.
Unlike most civil disobedience today, in the civil rights movement
of the 1950s and 1960s the disobeyed laws themselves were often
the object of protest. Rosa Parks launched a citywide bus boycott by
her lone and courageous refusal, on December 1, 1955, to move to
the back of a Montgomery, Alabama, bus. Hers was an act of diso-
bedience of a law, the Montgomery segregation ordinance, that was
itself unjust-indeed, it was found to be unconstitutional.' 14 This
type of disobedience frequently is referred to as "direct" civil diso-
bedience. By contrast, in "indirect" civil disobedience, the dis-
obeyed law is not itself the object of protest.
15
Some have held that the distinction between direct and indirect
civil disobedience is fundamental. Justice Abe Fortas wrote that
11. The most famous exponent of this view was Mohandas Gandhi. In 1922 Gandhi
declared to the judge who was trying him on a charge of sedition: "Nonviolence implies
voluntary submission to the penalty for non-co-operation with evil. I am here, there-
fore, to invite and submit cheerfully to the highest penalty that can be inflicted upon me
for what in law is a deliberate crime and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a
citizen." Gandhi, A Plea for the Severest Penalty Upon Conviction for Sedition, Mar. 23,
1922, quoted in Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 471 A.2d 462, 473 (Pa. 1984).
12. Letter from a Birmingham Jail (1963), in 1 A.J. Muste Memorial Institute Essay
Series 21.
13. Id. at 16. For others, the avoidance of punishment may be the chosen strategy.
The Berrigans, for example, refused to yield to state authorities following actions to end
the Vietnam war. See N. Chomsky, For Reasons of State 285 (1970). Either strategy, of
course, is consistent with efforts to legally justify the disobedient act.
14. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352
U.S. 903 (1956).
15. Almost identical formulations of this distinction are found in Greenblatt, De-
fense of the Civilly Disobedient, 13 N.C. Cent. L.J. 158, 159-60 (1982); Note, supra note




only the former could be justified on moral or legal grounds: "In my
judgment civil disobedience-the deliberate violation of law-is
neverjustified in our nation where the law being violated is not itself
the focus or target of the protest."' 6 This has never been the view
of the Supreme Court, however. In Boynton v. Virginia, for example,
the Court overturned the convictions of "Freedom Riders" who had
been arrested on charges of violating a Virginia trespass statute af-
ter refusing to leave the "white" section of a bus terminal restau-
rant. 17 The Court held that they had a federal right to sit wherever
they chose.' Their disobedience was justified even though the dis-
obeyed law-the trespass statute-was not itself the direct focus or
target of the protest.
The traditional dichotomy between direct and indirect disobedi-
ence ignores the essential similarity of the Montgomery bus sit-in
and the Virginia Freedom Ride. Although the courts took some
time to recognize the fact, both Mrs. Parks and the Freedom Riders
had a legal right to remain seated in the "white" section. In both
cases, the orders to move infringed on protected rights. Therefore,
in neither case did the protesters need a reason to remain seated.
That the sources of the orders differed-one a segregation statute,
the other a trespass statute-is largely irrelevant.
Although they fall within the definition of indirect civil disobedi-
ence, most acts of civil disobedience committed by peace activists
have a legal posture entirely different from that of the Freedom
Rides. Whereas the trespass laws were invalid as applied to the
Freedom Riders sitting-in at bus stations, the trespass laws used to
evict nuclear protestors are valid, both on their face and as applied.
Consequently, trespass at a weapons facility, unlike at a lunch
counter, requires an affirmative legal justification. In other words,
one needs a reason to sit-in at a weapons facility. The reasons most
16. A. Fortas, Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience 63 (1968). As a jurist,
however, Justice Fortas did not adhere to this rule. Hejoined the dissenting opinions in
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1966) (Warren, C.J., Douglas, J., Brennan,
J., dissenting), in which the Court upheld the conviction of civil rights activists who had
disobeyed a court order enjoining their planned march in Birmingham. The underlying
statute at issue was a parade ordinance, and was not itself the focus or target of the
protest.
17. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 456 (1960).
18. 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (protesters in bus terminal restaurant had a federal right,
under the Interstate Commerce Act, to sit-in). Segregating facilities at bus terminal
lunch counters and waiting rooms was declared unconstitutional in United States v.
Lassiter, 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. La. 1962), affd per curiam, 371 U.S. 10 (1962). More
generally, segregation in public places was outlawed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6.
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commonly asserted are those based on the doctrine of necessity and
international law. 19
II. The Necessity Defense
Our legal system permits lawbreaking, even of valid laws, under
certain circumstances. A reasonable belief that breaking the law is
necessary to prevent the occurrence of a greater harm forms the
basis of the necessity, or "choice of evils," defense. The rationale
for the defense is grounded in public policy: The law ought to pro-
mote the achievement of higher values at the expense of lesser ones.
At times, this goal may require that one ignore the literal language
of the criminal law.
20
While the doctrine of necessity has its roots in the common law,2 1
over 20 states have now incorporated the defense in their penal
codes. 22 Many of these adopt the formulation proposed by the
American Law Institute in the Model Penal Code, entitled "Justifica-
tion Generally: Choice of Evils":
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm
or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides
exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved;
and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does
not otherwise plainly appear.
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the
situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the ne-
cessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this Section is un-
19. The focus on necessity and international law is not intended to suggest the irrel-
evance of other defenses for the civilly disobedient. Defendants may pursue a variety of
technical, statutory, and constitutional defenses. See Greenblatt, supra note 15, at 178-
88.
20. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 441 (2d ed. 1986). See also Arnolds & Gar-
land, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 289, 289 (1974).
The necessity defense is also recognized in the law of torts. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 196 (1965).
21. See Model Penal Code § 3.02 comment I (1985). See Aldridge & Stark, supra note
7, at 301-03 for a concise history of the necessity defense.





available in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or
negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
2 3
Under subsection (1), the actor must believe that the conduct is nec-
essary to avoid a harm that is greater than the harm sought to be
prevented by the disobeyed law. Subsection (2) implies that for cer-
tain offenses, such belief must be reasonable. If the actor was un-
reasonable, that is, reckless or negligent, "in appraising the
necessity for his conduct," then the necessity defense will be un-
available "for any offense for which recklessness or negligence ...
suffices to establish culpability.' 24
The dispute in civil disobedience trials does not generally turn on
the "balancing of evils" element. The evils of bombing, apartheid,
or nuclear annihilation unquestionably outweigh the evils of public
disturbance or unlawful entry. 2 5 Nor does the dispute generally
turn on the Model Code formulation of subsections (1)(b) and
(1)(c), under which the general "choice of evils" defense must give
way "if the issue of competing values has been previously foreclosed
by a deliberate legislative choice." 26 Rather, the dispute usually
concerns the requirement that the defendants reasonably believed
that their conduct was necessary to avert the greater harm. This re-
quirement entails that: (1) "a direct causal relationship [was] reason-
ably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the
harm," 2 7 and (2) the defendants reasonably believed that there was
no opportunity to avert the harm without doing the criminal act. An
act would not be necessary, in other words, if it were unlikely to be
effective or if alternative means existed to achieve the same goals.
In many jurisdictions, necessity has been saddled with a third ele-
ment: that the evil the actor seeks to avoid be imminent. Penn-
sylvania, for example, requires that the actor face "a public disaster
23. Model Penal Code § 3.02 (1985).
The Model Penal Code places the burden of persuasion on the prosecution: "The
prosecution need not negative a justification defense until there is evidence supporting
the defense, but it must disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt if evidence of
the defense is introduced." Id. § 3.01 explanatory note at 5. See id. § 3.01 comment 1,
nn.4, 5, for states that follow the Model Penal Code in this respect.
24. Other formulations of the necessity defense are stricter, and would deny the de-
fense in prosecutions for all offenses where the actor's belief was unreasonable. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05(2) (McKinney 1984). See Model Penal Code § 3.02 comment 5,
n.28 (1985) for states that follow the Model Penal Code rule on this question. See gener-
ally id. comment 5, for a discussion of the issue.
25. But see infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
26. Model Penal Code § 3.02 comment 2, at 13 (1985). See infra text accompanying
notes 64-66 for further discussion of the issue of legislative preclusion.
27. United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101, 102 (4th Cir. 1979).
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that was clear and imminent, not debatable or speculative."-28 A
New York statute requires that the conduct be "necessary as an
emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private in-
jury." 29 The authors of the Model Penal Code, however, explicitly
reject imminence "as an absolute requirement, since there may be
situations in which an otherwise illegal act is necessary to avoid an
evil that may occur in the future."
30
A. Matters of Fact and Law: The Importance of the Jury
The main questions for decision at civil disobedience trials are
factual ones. Was it reasonable to anticipate that the act of civil dis-
obedience would be effective? Were there legal means to avert the
harm? Was the harm imminent? These questions should be re-
solved by jury.31 In Morissette v. United States, the Supreme Court
underscored the importance of the jury's role as fact-finder:
Jurors may be perverse, the ends of justice may be defeated by un-
righteous verdicts, but so long as the functions of the judge and jury
are distinct, the one responding to the law, the other to the facts,
neither can invade the province of the other without destroying the
significance of trial by court and jury.
32
In cases involving civil disobedience, however, judges consistently
have invaded the province of the jury. In numerous trials, 33 they
have refused to permit the jury to hear the necessity defense by rul-
ing as a matter of law that the defendants' evidence failed to meet an
28. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226, 229 (Pa. 1985).
29. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05 (McKinney 1984). See Model Penal Code § 3.02 com-
ment 5, nn.21, 23, 24 (1985) for citations to other states that require imminence as an
element of the necessity defense.
30. Model Penal Code § 3.02 comment 3, at 16, 17 (1985). Cf W. LaFave & A.
Scott, supra note 20, at 449:
It is sometimes said that the defense of necessity does not apply except in an emer-
gency-when the threatened harm is immediate, the threatened disaster imminent.
Perhaps this is but a way of saying that, until the time comes when the threatened
harm is immediate, there are generally options open to the defendant, to avoid the
harm, other than the option of disobeying the literal terms of the law. (Footnotes
omitted)
31. Contrast these questions to the question of balancing the harms, which the
Model Penal Code describes as "an interpretation of the law of the offense." Model
Penal Code § 3.02 comment 2 at 12 (1985). The Model Code leaves unresolved "the
question of how far the balancing of values should be determined by the court as a
matter of law or submitted to the jury." Id. Certain states, however, appear to confer
this judgment on the court. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05 (McKinney 1984). See
Model Penal Code § 3.02 comment 5, n.33 (1985) for states that follow the New York
statute.
32. 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (quoting People v. Flack, 26 N.E. 267, 270 (N.Y.
1891)).
33. Aldridge & Stark, supra note 7.
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indeterminate "minimum standard." The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court described the judge's role as follows:
As with any offer of proof, it is essential that the offer meet a minimum
standard as to each element of the defense so that if a jury finds it to
be true, it would support the affirmative defense. Where the offer is
insufficient to establish any one element of the defense, the trial court
may deny use of the defense and prohibit evidence as to the other
elements of the defense.
34
Nowhere does the court define the "minimum standard." The result
is a process that allows a trial judge unsympathetic to the disobedi-
ent activists to exclude evidence that the jury should hear.
The broad discretion thus assumed by the judge threatens the
fundamental constitutional rights of the civilly disobedient defend-
ant.3 5 The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution
provide that citizens shall not be deprived of "life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." The sixth amendment provides
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." Under these
guarantees, criminal defendants must be permitted to defend them-
selves before a jury, and to present testimony relevant to their de-
fense. "Few rights," held the United States Supreme Court in
Chambers v. Mississippi, "are more fundamental than that of an ac-
cused to present witnesses in his own defense." 36 The Court
elaborated:
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence,
the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations
."A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him,
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in
court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to
offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel."
'37
For the civilly disobedient defendant, there is no "fair opportunity
to defend against the State's accusations" if he or she is denied the
right "to be heard in his [or her] defense," "to present witnesses,"
34. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d at 229. See also N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05
(McKinney 1984) ("Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification . . . is
offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the claimed facts
and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense.").
35. For the due process argument made in this subsection, I am indebted to Al-
dridge & Stark, supra note 7, at 303-04, 334, 347-49.
36. 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (citations omitted).
37. 410 U.S. at 294 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (BlackJ.) (em-
phasis added)). See also United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 912 (D. Mass. 1969)
(court's exclusion of basic issues relevant to defense would violate defendant's right to
due process).
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and "to offer testimony" with respect to each of the elements of the
necessity defense.
B. The Causality Element
In Commonwealth v. Berrigan, a group of pacifists called the "Plow-
shares Eight" were convicted for hammering nuclear warhead
nosecones at the General Electric plant in King of Prussia, Penn-
sylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing the appellate
court, rejected the necessity defense because "the actions chosen by
Appellees (destruction of the casings and pouring of human blood)
could not under any hypothesis reasonably be expected to be effec-
tive in avoiding the perceived public disaster of a nuclear holo-
caust."'38 Because of the court's factual assumptions about the
inefficacy of civil disobedience, the jury was robbed of its role as
fact-finder, and the defendants were robbed of their constitutional
rights and of possible acquittals.
It is difficult, of course, to prove that a single act of civil disobedi-
ence will be effective. In any broad social movement, the factors
that lead to change are difficult to isolate. Nevertheless, civil diso-
bedience campaigns clearly have played a central role in social
change. The "Boston Tea Party," violations of the Fugitive Slave
Acts, the sit-down strikes of the 1930s-all were integral to the
achievement of a more just society. 39 More recently, civil disobedi-
ence was the core and inspiration of the civil rights struggle. The
lunch counter sit-ins and Freedom Rides combined with legal
marches and meetings to abolish Jim Crow in the South. Although
it is rare for policy makers to acknowledge the effectiveness of those
whose methods they disparage, President Lyndon Johnson praised
"the American Negro" as the "real hero of this struggle.... His
actions and protests, his call to risk safety, and even to risk his life,
38. 501 A.2d at 230. Other courts have ruled as a matter of law on the ineffective-
ness of: spray painting government property to terminate the MX missile program,
United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1985); blocking entry to the Rocky Flats
nuclear facility to change United States weapons policy, United States v. Seward, 687
F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982); trespassing on a naval installation to terminate the Trident
submarine program, United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980); pouring blood
and ashes on the Pentagon to change United States weapons policy, United States v.
Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1979); burning selective service records to stop the Viet-
nam War, United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972); and trespassing at a
Honeywell Corporation office to stop the Vietnam War, State v. Marley, 509 P.2d 1095
(Haw. 1973).
39. See generally S. Lens, Radicalism in America (1966); The Power of the People:
Active Nonviolence in the United States (R. Cooney & H. Michalowski eds. 1977) [here-




have awakened the conscience of this nation. His demonstrations
have been designed to call attention to injustice; designed to pro-
voke change; designed to stir reform."
40
There is also little question that civil disobedience tempered
United States aggression in Indochina. Noam Chomsky, a critical
observer of the Vietnam war, has written that evidence "supports
the judgment that mass protest and resistance have been a major
factor in bringing about the changes of tactics in executive policy in
recent years."-4' There is concrete evidence that the 1969 actions
against the war caused President Richard Nixon to withdraw plans
to escalate the war, when he became convinced that he would not
have sufficient public support.4 2 Those plans included the use of
tactical nuclear weapons against North Vietnam.
43
Too little time has passed for a confident measure of the influence
of civil disobedience in the current movements for social change,
such as the antinuclear movement and the movement to stop CIA
covert activities. 44 But history's lessons belie the Berrigan court's
confidence in the inefficacy "under any hypothesis" of the Plow-
shares action. That court should have adopted the more accommo-
dating approach proposed by Justice Edmund Spaeth in his
concurrence in the lower court's opinion in Berrigan:
Appellants do not assert that their action would avoid nuclear war
(what a grandiose and unlikely idea!). Instead ... their belief was that
their action, in combination with the actions of others, might accelerate a
political process ultimately leading to the abandonment of nuclear mis-
siles. And that belief, I submit, should not be dismissed as "unreason-
able as a matter of law." A jury might-or might not-find it
40. Television address by President Lyndon B. Johnson (Mar. 15, 1965), quoted in
Nonviolence, supra note 39, at 171.
At the Northampton trial for civil disobedience directed against the CIA, see supra note
1, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark testified on the role of civil disobedience
at the beginning of the modern civil rights movement: "I believe that if Rosa Parks had
not refused to move to the back of the bus, you and I might never have heard of Dr.
Martin Luther King. It took that kind of dramatic action to awaken this nation to its flaw
of racism." In These Times, Apr. 29-May 5, 1987, at 3, col. 3.
41. N.Chomsky, supra note 13, at 292.
42. D. Ellsberg, Introduction: Call to Mutiny, in Protest and Survive xvi (E.P.
Thompson & D. Smith eds. 1981).
43. Id. at xv.
44. Some comments, however, are suggestive of the impact of civil disobedience.
After committing civil disobedience at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site on June 2, 1986,
Harvard psychiatrist John Mack wrote: "Several Congressmen have told us that the Au-
gust vote, in which the House committed itself to cutting off funds for nuclear-weapons
testing, was very much affected by the demonstrations." Mack, Action and Academia in
the Nuclear Age, Harv. Mag., Jan.-Feb. 1987 at 27.
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unreasonable as a matter offact. But that is for a jury to say, not for a
court.
4 5
Unlike the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice
Spaeth appreciated both the due process rights of the civilly disobe-
dient and the lessons of past civil disobedience campaigns.
C. The Lack of Alternatives Element
Some courts have rejected the necessity defense on the ground
that the defendants' offer of proof was insufficient with respect to
the requirement that no alternative legal means exist to avert the
greater harm. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, for example,
wrote that those "who oppose nuclear power have other lawful
means of protesting nuclear power," so they need not trespass.
4 6
Similarly, with respect to trespassers on military property, the Sev-
enth Circuit declared: "There are thousands of opportunities for the
propagation of the anti-nuclear message: in the nation's electoral
process; by speech on public streets, in parks, in auditoriums, in
churches and lecture halls; and by the release of information to the
media, to name only a few." 4 7 On this view, the necessity defense
would appear to fail as a matter of law as long as the defendants had
alternative lawful means of conveying their "message."
There are, of course, many ways in which the civilly disobedient
might express their views. But this fact by itself should not preclude
the use of the necessity defense. The question for decision should
not be whether any legal alternative exists, but rather whether any
"legal alternative [exists] which will be effective in abating the imme-
diate public disaster." 48 Thus a passerby who breaks into a burning
house to rescue a trapped child need not first call the fire depart-
ment-a lawful means of expressing the message-if he or she has
good reason to believe that committing trespass would increase the
chances of saving the child.
The civilly disobedient may have reason to believe that the avail-
able legal means of protest will not be effective. Activists frequently
have spent years engaged in legal, but unsuccessful, efforts to avert
the dangers they perceive before turning-often reluctantly-to civil
45. Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 472 A.2d 1099, 1115 (Pa. Super. 1984) (Spaeth,J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original), rev'd, 501 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1985).
46. State v. Dorsey, 395 A.2d 855, 857 (N.H. 1978).
47. United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1984). See also United
States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270
(10th Cir. 1982); In re Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d 44, 210 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1985); State v.
Marley, 509 P.2d 1095 (Haw. 1973).




disobedience. The defense attorney for the Winooski 44, the
Vermonters who occupied Senator Robert Stafford's office, told the
jury: "They petitioned, and petitioned, and petitioned, and it didn't
work. . . .Have they met with a stone wall? Yes, yes; they have
repeatedly."4
9
The credibility of the defendants, and the reasonableness of their
belief that legal recourse would be futile, are matters for the jury to
decide. The determination may require testimony on the history of
unsuccessful legal attempts to avert the perceived danger, on the
inadequacies and inefficiencies of the electoral system, on the indif-
ference of the media, and so on. In short, the inquiry is one that is
particularly fact-laden. For the court to prejudge the matter is effec-
tively to deny defendants their right to trial by jury.
D. The Imminence Element
In other civil disobedience trials, courts refused the necessity de-
fense on the ground that the defendants were unable to meet the
minimum standard with respect to the imminence requirement. For
example, in State v. Warshow, the danger of an accident at a nuclear
power plant was held too "speculative and uncertain"--again, as a
matter of law-to constitute an imminent danger. 50 The imminence
test imposed on the defendants was strict: The danger "must be, or
must reasonably appear to be, threatening to occur immediately,
near at hand, and impending. "5 In Berrigan, discussed above, the
Court held that the defendants' offer of proof, "as a matter of law,
... was insufficient to establish that the harm was a clear and immi-
nent public disaster."'52 Here, too, the imminence test was strict:
"that the actor was faced with a public disaster that was clear and
imminent, not debatable or speculative."
53
49. Por Amor, supra note 7, at 140, 141.
50. 410 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Vt. 1979). See also Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 498 A.2d
806, 809 (Pa. 1985). Note Justice Franklin Billings' dissent in Warshow: "Where there is
evidence offered which supports the elements of the defense, the questions of reasona-
bleness and credibility are for the jury to decide." 410 A.2d at 1005 (Billings,J., dissent-
ing). He believed that "the trial court struck too soon in excluding the offered
evidence" and that the defendants were denied "a fair trial merely because they express
unpopular political views." 410 A.2d at 1006. See Note, supra note 7.
51. 410 A.2d at 1002.
52. 501 A.2d at 230.
53. 501 A.2d at 229. Note that the Warshow formulation of the imminence test al-
lows for reasonable error, while in Berrigan, imminence has to be proven as a matter of
fact. If literally construed, the Bernigan formulation is too harsh, and probably harsher
than the Bernigan court intended. It would bar the defense whenever a harm is in fact
nonimminent, even though in the circumstances all reasonable people would have be-
lieved that the harm was imminent and the preventive action warranted.
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The necessity defense should have been allowed in these cases
because the defendants were prepared to show a clear and substan-
tial danger of nuclear accident or war, whether or not a specific acci-
dent or detonation was foreseeable. To disallow the defense on the
theory that the defendants failed to pass the strict imminence test of
Warshow and Berrigan contravenes the public policy behind the ne-
cessity defense. If forced to wait until a nuclear accident threatens
"to occur immediately," protesters will surely lose the opportunity
for effective action. Prior to the Three Mile Island crisis, for exam-
ple, one could not have known that the accident threatened "to oc-
cur immediately." There comes a time when citizen intervention is
too late.
The strict imminence test is most clearly inappropriate when im-
posed on citizen actions, like the Plowshares', aimed at preventing
nuclear war. 54 The mere possibility of a nuclear war, the litany of
horrors whose proportions dwarf all the catastrophes of history,
suggests the absurdity of the focus on imminence. Whether nuclear
war comes in 20 years or next week, either possibility should satisfy
the minimal elements of necessity. Whether the imminence require-
ment is abandoned altogether or merely construed more leniently,
the law should not require that citizens wait until the moment
before their incineration before it permits a necessity defense for
disobedient action.
55
IlL Defenses Involving International Law
The civilly disobedient often attempt to introduce international
law in aid of the necessity defense: If the government policy they
oppose violates norms of international criminal law, then it is per-
force a grave harm. Defendants also sometimes introduce interna-
54. Actions to prevent nuclear annihilation are also justifiable as self defense. Lisa
Peattie, M.I.T. Professor of Anthropology Emeritus, was arrested for civil disobedience
at the Nevada Test Site in June 1986. In her defense she wrote: "Another basis for the
right of citizens to take action toward stopping the preparations for nuclear war is the
basic right of persons to defend themselves and their children." Mack, supra note 44, at
29.
To my knowledge, no nuclear protester has yet been acquitted on grounds of self-
defense.
55. Jonathan Schell wrote:
[O]ur extinction will be swift; it will literally be over before we know it. We have to
match swiftness with swiftness. Because everything we do and everything we are is
in jeopardy, and because the peril is immediate and unremitting, every person is the
right person to act and every moment is the right moment to begin, starting with
the present moment.




tional law to support justifications different from the necessity
defense, based on the common law crime prevention privilege and
on the Nuremberg Principles. These justifications have received lit-
tle recognition in the courts. Evidence on international law has
often been excluded along with evidence on necessity. 56 In very few
cases has a judge given the jury instructions on international law,
and, even then, rarely have they been independent of instructions
on the necessity doctrine. 57 The viability of defenses based solely
on international law, therefore, is far from certain. This does not
mean that civilly disobedient defendants should abandon interna-
tional law defenses, for these defenses often reflect part of the un-
derlying motive for the act of disobedience. Defendants will have
more success in getting their arguments and testimony to the jury,
however, if the international law elements of their defense are intro-
duced as part of an overall necessity defense.
All the arguments based on international law begin with the rec-
ognition that international law is binding on federal and state courts
in the United States. Article VI of the United States Constitution
upholds treaties, along with federal laws and the Constitution itself,
as "the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding." The Supreme Court stated in The
Paquete Habana: "International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination.- 58 Absent a later, supersed-
ing act of Congress, valid treaties signed and ratified by the United
States must be honored in domestic courts.
59
56. See, e.g., United States v. Cottier, 759 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1985); State v. Marley,
509 P.2d 1095 (Haw. 1973); Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1985).
Some courts have denied litigants the use of international law defenses on grounds of
standing. See United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970).
57. See, e.g., State v. Keller, No. 1372-4-84 CnCr (Chittendon Cir. Dist. Ct., Vt.
1984).
58. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Treaties are not the only source of international law:
"[Wihere there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as
evidence of these, to the works ofjurists and commentators." Id.
59. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). See generally, L. Henkin, Foreign
Affairs and the Constitution 156-167 (1972).
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A. International Law as Evidence
International law may be introduced at trial in support of the ne-
cessity defense. First, evidence that the perceived harms are serious
crimes under international law helps substantiate the defendants'
claim that they outweigh the harm caused by the act of disobedi-
ence. This was the use to which international law was put in State v.
Keller,60 the trial of the Winooski 44. After instructing the jury on
the relevant international legal principles, Judge Frank Mahady then
charged the jury "to consider those legal principles in weighing the
relative value of the injuries which the Defendants claim they saw
impending from the perceived emergency in Central America
against the seriousness of the criminal trespass allegedly committed
by them." 6' The illegality of the harms-the bombing of civilians,
for instance-was further evidence of their gravity.
Second, international law may be introduced as evidence of the
harm's legal status. The necessity defense is unavailable if the al-
leged evil is not legally cognizable. This does not mean that the evil
must be a crime: In the paradigmatic example of necessity involving
trespass in a burning house, the defense is equally appropriate
whether the fire was set by accident or arson. It does mean that a
judicial determination may preclude the defendant's choice of evils.
For example, a court that denied the necessity defense to anti-abor-
tion activists who had interfered with women seeking abortions rea-
soned as follows: (1) necessity presupposes a choice between two
evils; (2) since 1973 when the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, 62
first trimester abortion is not a "legally recognized injury," or evil;
therefore, by judicial preclusion, (3) the defendants could not justify
their trespass by necessity.
63
A similar argument in derogation of the necessity defense rests on
the theory of legislative preclusion. 64 The Model Penal Code disal-
lows the necessity defense if "a legislative purpose to exclude the
justification . . . plainly appear[s]." 6 5 Such legislative purpose ap-
pears, the argument runs, if Congress has endorsed the government
policies that are responsible for the harms in question. As applied
to typical acts of civil disobedience, however, the legislative preclu-
sion argument is not persuasive. Much government policy, espe-
60. No. 1372-4-84 CnCr (Chittendon Cir. Dist. Ct., Vt. 1984).
61. Por Amor, supra note 7, at 149.
62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. People v. Krizka, 416 N.E.2d 36, 37 (Ill. 1981).
64. See, e.g., State v. Warshow, 410 A.2d at 1003 (Hill, J., concurring).




cially foreign policy, is conducted without express congressional
approval (the Iran-Contra affair providing a contemporary exam-
ple). Even when the Executive acts pursuant to legislation, the
scope of what Congress has approved remains unclear. For exam-
ple, an aid package to the Contras does not imply that Congress has
approved the terror inflicted by the Contras on the Nicaraguan peo-
ple. And that harm, certainly, is a legally cognizable injury.
Furthermore, if the harm-torture, for example-is demonstrably
illegal under international law, 6 6 then it becomes even less plausible
to argue that, by passing an appropriations bill, Congress has pre-
cluded the defendants' balancing of evils. The argument is less
plausible still if the Executive policy that Congress has authorized is
itself in violation of international law.
B. The Privilege to Prevent the Commission of Crimes
A defense closely related to necessity is the "crime prevention de-
fense." 67 Many acts of civil disobedience involve attempts to stop or
prevent the implementation of government policies that are be-
lieved to be in violation of international law. Defendants in these
cases may argue that their otherwise unlawful actions were justified
under the crime prevention defense as attempts to stop ongoing or
imminent crimes. In this defense, international law is introduced to
establish the illegality of the government policy. Unlike the necessity
defense, where international law is raised as evidence of a greater
harm, here international law is an essential component of the
defense.
The common law privilege of crime prevention,6" like the doc-
trine of necessity, has been codified in numerous state penal
codes. 69 The American Law Institute proposes the following:
66. Torture is prohibited under, inter alia, article 5 of the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.Doc. A/8 10, at 73 (1948). The pro-
hibition of torture as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights forms a
part of customary international law, and was therefore held to be binding in United
States courts in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Indeed, Congress
itself has asserted that torture is a gross violation of internationally recognized human
rights. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982 & Supps. 1985, 1986) (United States foreign
assistance linked to human rights considerations).
67. See generally Campbell, The Nuremberg Defense to Charges of Domestic Crime:
A Non-Traditional Approach for Nuclear-Arms Protestors, 16 Cal. West. Int'l L.J. 93
(1986).
68. See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 1108-09 (3d ed. 1982) ("[A]ny unof-
fending person may intervene for the purpose of preventing the commission or consum-
mation of any crime if he does so without resorting to measures which are excessive
under all the facts of the particular case.").
69. See Model Penal Code § 3.07 comment 6, n.44 (1985).
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Use of Force to Prevent Suicide or the Commission of a Crime.
(a) The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifi-
able when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary
to prevent such other person from committing suicide, inflicting seri-
ous bodily injury upon himself, committing or consummating the com-
mission of a crime involving or threatening bodily injury, damage to or
loss of property or a breach of the peace.
70
The steps taken to prevent the crime must be reasonable, or the
actor will be subject to liability for recklessness or negligence.
7'
Thus the inquiry should be very like the inquiry into the availability
of the necessity defense. Was the conduct "immediately necessary"
to prevent the perceived crime? That is, was the danger imminent,
was there no effective legal alternative, and was the chosen conduct
reasonably calculated to abate the perceived crime? The factual na-
ture of this inquiry raises the same due process concerns discussed
above in relation to the necessity defense.
7 2
The crime prevention justification, however, may have less utility
for the civilly disobedient than the necessity defense. Some courts
have limited the applicability of the former to circumstances where
the crime sought to be prevented or terminated occurs in the de-
fendant's presence. 73 The necessity defense has no equivalent
requirement.
C. The Nuremberg Defense: Civil Disobedience as an Effort to Avoid
Complicity in International Crimes
The principle that individuals may be held responsible for crimes
under international law derives from the prosecution of Nazi war
criminals at Nuremberg, West Germany, after World War II. The
Nuremberg trials were conducted according to principles set out in
a charter signed by the United States and other Allied powers.7 4 Ar-
ticle 6 of the Charter, which defines war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, and crimes against peace, states in part: "Leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formula-
tion or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of
the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any
70. Model Penal Code § 3.07(5) (1985). The paragraphs that follow the passage
quoted in the text limit the degree of force permitted, limitations that are not relevant to
nonviolent civil disobedience.
71. Model Penal Code § 3.07 comment 6, at 129 (1985).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
73. See State v. Marley, 509 P.2d at 1108.
74. Charter of the International Military Tribunal (London Agreement), Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1546, E.A.S. No. 472. See Falk, The Nuremberg Defense in the Pentagon




persons in execution of such plan." Article 8 states: "The fact that
the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his government or of a
superior shall not free him of responsibility, but may be considered
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice
so requires."
The case law that developed at Nuremberg elaborated on the
scope of these responsibilities. According to Richard Falk, Milbank
Professor of International Law at Princeton University, the cases es-
tablished that
the zone of individual responsibility for crimes against the peace ex-
tended well beyond principal policy-makers and state leaders. The re-
sponsibility of secondary figures for war crimes generally turned upon
whether they had voluntarily aided and abetted illegal acts in a situa-
tion in which they had or should have had adequate knowledge of their
character. The basis of potential legal responsibility rested on the ex-
tent of complicity as reflected in actions and knowledge.
75
The import for the civilly disobedient of this continuum of responsi-
bility is that defendants who are close to the centers of power, either
as policy makers in the military or civilian government or as leading
industrialists, 76 have a more compelling justification for their diso-
bedience than do citizens not so connected. The former may plausi-
bly argue that their act of disobedience was justified as an attempt to
terminate complicity and thereby discharge their obligations under
Nuremberg.
For example, in the Pentagon Papers case, 77 Daniel Ellsberg and
Anthony Russo were prosecuted for disclosing to the public major
portions of the so-called "Pentagon Papers" on the Vietnam war.
Although the charges were ultimately dismissed because of govern-
ment misconduct, a Nuremberg defense had been prepared for the
defendants by Professor Falk. He argued that: (1) the defendants
had good reason to believe that the United States was violating in-
ternational law in Vietnam; (2) the defendants could reasonably in-
fer that they were accessories to the commission and execution of
the illegal policies; (3) the defendants could have been indicted for
these acts in accordance with precedents established at Nuremberg;
and (4) disclosing the Papers was a reasonable effort to terminate
their complicity.78 For the court to disallow proof of the justifica-
75. Falk, supra note 74, at 231.
76. See United States v. Flick, 6 Trials of War Criminals 1 (1952) (involving indict-
ments brought against German industrialists for participation in Nuremberg crimes).
77. United States v. Russo, No. 9373 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 1971) (dismissed on proce-
dural grounds). See generally Falk, supra note 74.
78. Falk, supra note 74, at 209.
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tion, wrote Professor Falk, would appear "to deny defendants a very
fundamental ingredient of due process."
79
The defense in this case is particularly compelling because the de-
fendants had been active in the formulation of policy in Vietnam-
Ellsberg as an advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Russo
as a RAND Corporation analyst. "Both defendants occupied posi-
tions for which a presumption of legal jeopardy was not unreasona-
ble if one were to assume an American willingness to implement
relevant portions of international criminal law." 8 0 The viability of
the Nuremberg defense is less obvious for defendants who are not
involved in the formulation of government policy. Their culpability
under the Nuremberg Charter, as a matter of law, becomes increas-
ingly speculative. 8 '
Some defendants, however, have urged courts to accept a broader
interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles. In the narrow interpre-
tation, complicity derives from proximity to power, and the minimal
duty is to withdraw from, or refuse to participate in, the prohibited
conduct. In the broader interpretation, complicity derives from the
opportunity to prevent others from engaging in acts thought to be
criminal under international law. Accomplices thus have an affirma-
tive duty to take reasonable steps to stop or prevent the commission
of the crimes.8 2 Arguments based on the two interpretations often
merge: Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo hoped that by disclosing
the "Pentagon Papers" they would help to stop the atrocities they
believed were being committed by the United States in Vietnam, as
well as end their own complicity.
Support for the broad interpretation is found in the Tokyo War
Crimes Judgment, which concluded that persons may be held re-
sponsible for violations of international law if: "(1) [t]hey had
knowledge that such crimes were being committed and having such
knowledge they failed to take such steps as were within their power
79. Id.
80. Id. at 234.
81. See State v. Marley, 509 P.2d at 1111 (dismissing as "frivolous any contention
that [the civilian defendants] were legally obligated to act to avoid criminal liability"
under Nuremberg).
82. Note that the broad interpretation of the Nuremberg Defense is analytically dis-
tinct from the domestic crime prevention justification as set forth supra text accompany-
ing notes 67-73. The former involves an affirmative obligation on which defendants must
act, in accordance with the dictates of the Nuremberg Principles; the latter is only a
privilege. To be successful, however, both defenses ultimately turn on the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's means of discharging his or her duty or acting on his or her




to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future, or (2) they
are at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge."
' ' 3
No American court, however, has given the Nuremberg Principles
such broad sweep. While the civilly disobedient may have a strong
moral claim under Nuremberg, absent special circumstances such as
those in the Pentagon Papers case, vindication through the courts ap-
pears unlikely. Furthermore, even if the courts did accept that activ-
ists in the peace movement have a duty under Nuremberg to stop
government crimes, defendants would still encounter the judge's re-
luctance to regard civil disobedience as a legitimate means of dis-
charging that duty. The same obstacles that confront defendants
who try to raise the necessity defense before a jury would confront
defendants who claim that their disobedience was justified under the
Nuremberg Principles.
Conclusion
Civil disobedience is a direct challenge to the law, but it is also an
appeal to "higher" law. In the civil rights movement, defendants
were vindicated when the laws they disobeyed were found to be in-
valid under the Constitution or other supervening law. In the con-
temporary peace movement, civil disobedience usually involves the
violation of valid laws, and defendants have sought to justify their
conduct by raising defenses derived from the common law doctrines
of necessity and crime prevention and from the Nuremberg Princi-
ples. These defenses have been rejected by most courts.
A trend has emerged among the courts, however, to acknowledge
the utility of the necessity defense in civil disobedience trials. The
burden on the defendant is still heavy. First, the disobedient act
must reasonably be expected to lead to abatement of the harm. Sec-
ond, no effective lawful remedies must reasonably appear to be
available. Third, in many jurisdictions the harm must be imminent.
These requirements will never be easy to satisfy. Consequently,
carelessly planned or poorly executed civil disobedience actions will
not be condoned.
The welcome development in the courts is the recognition that if
defendants can produce factual evidence tending to prove each ele-
ment of necessity, then due process requires that their arguments
and testimony be submitted to the jury. Due process requires that
the judge appropriately charge the jury on the elements of the de-
83. Tokyo War Crimes Trial Decision, quoted in Crimes of War 113 (R. Falk, G. Kolko
& R. Lifton eds. 1971), reprinted in Falk, supra note 74, at 231.
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fense. Then the jury, as the conscience of the community, can cast
its judgment.
For conscience is at the core of civil disobedience trials. Consider
the debate between opposing counsel in State v. Keller,8 4 the case in
which the defendants had occupied United States Senator Robert
Stafford's office prior to a critical Senate vote on aid to the Contras
in Nicaragua. In closing argument, the prosecution told the jury:
It is not the United States policy that has been on trial here .... [M]y
personal beliefs, the Defendants' beliefs, your personal beliefs, are not
germane to the case which you have to decide. You have to look at the
facts. You have to be objective.... This is a criminal courtroom, and




It is relevant what the Defendants' beliefs are. It's very relevant. It's
crucial, and you may consider it and you should consider it because
their subjective belief about the emergency, and what is a reasonable
way to meet that emergency, is absolutely essential to understand their
actions and to realize the ultimate legality of what they did .... The
trespass is a minor act of civil disobedience in an attempt to stop the
horrendous wrong going on in Central America.... [The defendants]
were not involved in a simple trespass action; they were involved in an
act of conscience.
86
Conscience was relevant for Vermont District Court Judge Frank
Mahady as well. He advised the jury: "[T]he credibility of the wit-
nesses, the believability if you will, of the witnesses, and the weight
to be attached to their testimony, are entirely matters for your
sound, practical judgment as fair-minded men and women. ' 87 The
judge instructed the jury on the applicability of the necessity de-
fense and of international law. All defendants were acquitted.
84. No. 1372-4-84 CnCr (Chittendon Dist. Ct., Vt. 1984). Materials from the litiga-
tion are reprinted in Por Amor, supra note 7.
85. Por Amor, supra note 7, at 131, 135, 143.
86. Id. at 139, 140, 136.
87. Id. at 145.
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